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To enhance patient safety, data about actual clinical events must be collected and scrutinized. This paper has two purposes. First,
it provides an overview of some of the methods available to collect and analyze retrospective data about medical errors, near misses,
and other relevant patient safety events. Second, it introduces a methodological approach that focuses on non-routine events (NRE),
deﬁned as all events that deviate from optimal clinical care. In intermittent in-person surveys of anesthesia providers, 75 of 277
(27%) recently completed anesthetic cases contained a non-routine event (98 total NRE). Forty-six of the cases (17%) had patient
impact while only 20 (7%) led to patient injury. In contrast, in the same hospitals over a two-year period, we collected event data on
135 cases identiﬁed with traditional quality improvement processes (event incidence of 0.7–2.7%). In these quality improvement
cases, 120 (89%) had patient impact and 74 (55%) led to patient injury. Preliminary analyses not only illustrate some of the analytical
methods applicable to safety data but also provide insight into the potential value of the non-routine event approach for the early
detection of risks to patient safety before serious patient harm occurs.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Unfortunately, much too often everyday clinical
practice deviates undesirably from ‘‘best practice’’ or
what is considered optimal clinical care. Patient safety
has been deﬁned as ‘‘freedom from accidental injury’’
[1]. In the last few years, patient safety has become a
major public health issue and substantial resources have
been dedicated to the problem. To reduce medical errors
and enhance safety, rigorous methods must be applied
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doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2003.08.002events that occur. As has been described in detail else-
where [1–3], because a lack of patient safety is a ‘‘sys-
temic disease,’’ research must focus on care processes.
Thus, traditional empirical research methods that use
hard patient outcome variables (e.g., deaths) may be
limited in scope or applicability when addressing many
patient safety problems.
A variety of techniques are required to identify po-
tential risk factors that can lead to patient injury and to
then develop speciﬁc safety interventions to prevent
them. For example, when evaluating the risks associated
with the design of medical devices or diﬃculties with the
use of software interfaces, techniques from human fac-
tors engineering (also called ergonomics) may be par-
ticularly useful [4,5]. Laboratory experiments involving
biomechanical models and simulations can provide in-
sight into the interaction between medical devices, the
health care providers who use them, and the clinical
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neering techniques have been used previously to design
and develop safe medical devices, systems, and envi-
ronments [4–6]. On the other hand, alternative ap-
proaches involving empirical or exploratory methods
may be more fruitful when the risk factors are less
clearly deﬁned or understood, such as delineating the
relative contribution to ﬂawed processes of care of the
myriad factors related to patient attributes and disease
processes, clinician providers (e.g., psychological and
demographical factors), and the clinical care environ-
ment (including deﬁcient teamwork or communication).
In this situation, rigorous evidence is required to design
and implement successful patient safety interventions
that will have application beyond a single event, process,
or system. Such evidence can be obtained via either
prospective or retrospective approaches. Retrospective
data collection, the focus of this paper, is particularly
useful when investigating factors contributing to a rare
event, such as a medical error leading to patient injury,
since data may be collected from various sources, and is
less expensive than prospective collection.
This paper provides a succinct overview of some of
the methods available to collect and analyze retrospec-
tive data about medical errors, near misses, and other
relevant patient safety events. Second, it introduces the
concept of the ‘‘non-routine event’’ (NRE) in medicine,
a relatively new methodological approach that captures
data from all events that deviate from optimal clinical
care. Preliminary data from the retrospective collection
of these ‘‘non-routine events’’ in anesthesiology are then
presented and help to demonstrate several analytical
methods.2. Patient safety data collection methods
2.1. General approaches to collecting patient safety data
A wide variety of methods can be used to detect
clinical events of relevance to those seeking to enhance
patient safety. Patient safety data collection methods
diﬀer in the purpose of the eﬀort, the type of data col-
lected (both dependent and independent variables that
are measured), how those data are detected and re-
corded, and how the data are managed and archived for
later analysis. Clinical data may be collected for local
quality assurance or patient safety improvement pro-
jects, for use by public or private regional, national, or
even international entities for a variety of purposes,
or for research. The goals of the patient safety initiative
or project will aﬀect the choice and focus of data
collection methods.
At the highest level, there is a continuum from indi-
vidual clinical cases about which one may have ex-
haustive detailed event information to databases thatcontain only limited data about millions of cases. Ob-
viously, the analysis techniques will diﬀer—individual
cases may be most amenable to human factors or in-
dustrial engineering techniques (e.g., cognitive task
analysis interviews, failure-modes-and-eﬀects analysis)
whereas statistical or data mining techniques are more
appropriate for extracting relevant information from
large datasets. Similarly, how the results can be inter-
preted will also diﬀer, depending on the type of risk
factors associated with the adverse event. A detailed
analysis of a single case will have a good chance of
yielding an accurate understanding of the causes of that
event and local intervention strategies to mitigate future
similar events. Information gleaned from a single case
can be used to recognize previously unappreciated risk
factors and to design safety interventions to prevent
injury. However, the results from the analysis of a single
case (or relatively few cases) will only generalize well if
the risk factor or sequence of events leading to injury is
consistent in its manifestation across multiple care
processes, environments, or institutions. Thus, a case
involving complex multifactorial errors, in which both
system problems and situational dynamics (e.g., a series
of miscommunications among healthcare personnel,
teamwork problems, errors in judgment, etc.) contrib-
uted to injury are unlikely to generalize well, possibly
even to future events in the same care site. In contrast,
conclusions from statistical analysis of large datasets can
yield more generalized ﬁndings about risks to patient
safety, but these ﬁndings may be of quite limited validity
or applicability to speciﬁc local care settings.
With regard to the dependent measure of interest,
data collection methods may seek to investigate medi-
cal errors, adverse events, ‘‘sentinel events [7],’’ near
misses, or other deviations in process or outcome of
care (Table 1). Near misses (or ‘‘near hits’’) are events
that could have led, if not detected and corrected in a
timely manner, to patient injury. The study of near
misses to ascertain the likelihood of adverse events is
based on probabilistic risk assessment (i.e., if enough
near misses occur, some will inevitably lead to adverse
outcomes) [8]. The taxonomy of medical errors is
complex and there is currently no universally accepted
categorization strategy [3,9,10]. An emphasis during
data collection on human error is fraught with meth-
odological diﬃculties and may actually harm patient
safety eﬀorts within a healthcare organization [2,6,11].
Many types of patient safety data are gathered using
‘‘reporting systems,’’ structured processes for healthcare
professionals to identify events that occur to them or
their colleagues. These data typically are reported to and
collated by hospitals or other healthcare entities. The
primary goal of any reporting system should be to
feedback information to clinicians that will guide
changes in care processes, as well to administrators and
legislators who are involved in making systemic changes
Table 1
Patient safety data gathering methods
How data are obtained? Self-report, direct observation, survey instrument, interview, others report (including patient), chart
review, automated quality assurance report
What types of data are collected? Errors, adverse events, near misses, non-routine events
Method of entering data? Traditional paper forms (structured or free text), internet (including e-mail), other computer devices
(PDA), telephone
Purpose of data collection? Mandatory (local facility/state/federal), voluntary for quality improvement, research, or clinical
evaluation
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structure of the reporting system must address issues of
conﬁdentiality, immunity, and anonymity. Anonymous
systems are limited by the inability to interview the re-
porter or otherwise obtain additional information about
the event. Reporting systems that are not conﬁdential,
or do not at least provide immunity, will discourage
reporting of events where the clinician is concerned
about his/her culpability. These issues have been dis-
cussed in detail elsewhere [12].
Reporting systems can be voluntary or mandatory.
There is concern with voluntary systems that there will
be insuﬃcient impetus to report all events and that, in
fact, the most egregious events will be underreported.
However, mandatory reporting systems, often created
by state [13] and federal [14] agencies, are more likely to
be associated with punitive consequences, and tend to
discourage the accurate reporting of non-discoverable
serious events and their details.
Voluntary methods of obtaining data of relevance to
patient safety include clinician-activated event reporting
systems, organizational patient safety data gathering
systems (i.e., traditional event-based quality improve-
ment systems), independent observational methods, and
post-hoc mining of large clinical databases (Table 2).
The Australian Incident Monitoring System is a classic
example of a voluntary and anonymous clinician-acti-
vated reporting system [15]. Data about a wide varietyTable 2
Voluntary methods of reporting
Type of system Examples
Clinical event reporting systems  Electronic
 Informatio
improvem
 Incident r
Organizational patient safety data gathering systems  Traditiona
 Routine c
 Medical e
Independent observation by researchers or other
experienced individuals
 Direct obs
 Task anal
Post-hoc data mining of large databases  Closed cla
 Pharmaco
 Medicare
 Electronicof events are collected using report forms available in
speciﬁc clinical locations. The structured reporting sheet
contains the parameters of interest to elicit details about
an events contributing factors and any corrective ac-
tions taken. This information is then entered into a
central computerized national database. This type of
reporting system can also be ‘‘automated’’ through the
use of electronic forms [16].
In fact, patient safety data are increasingly collected
via electronic means. Email, the internet, laptop com-
puters, and personal digital assistants (PDA) have all
facilitated data collection of clinical events, particularly
for voluntary reporting systems. Electronic devices al-
low point-of-care incident reporting and on-demand
support in a blame-free environment, for example, in the
chemotherapy incident reporting and improvement
system [17]. This type of software allows users to create
logbooks that contain case information with event out-
comes that can be ﬁltered, aggregated, and stored in a
secure database for later analysis.
Organizational patient safety data gathering systems
include traditional quality improvement processes (e.g.,
point-of-care reporting of speciﬁc events being evaluated
organization-wide), risk management and peer review
processes (e.g., Patient Care Review Committees, the
clinical Morbidity and Mortality (M&M) conference
proceedings), routine care assessment surveys, medical
chart reviews, and some clinical surveillance systemsmonitoring databases—Anesthesia information management systems
n technology—The chemotherapy incident reporting and
ent system (CIRIS)
eporting technique—Australian incident monitoring study
l quality improvement including morbidity and mortality reporting
are assessment surveys—The clinical surveillance diary
vent-reporting system for transfusion medicine—MERS-TM
ervation
ysis
ims databases
logical databases (e.g., VA RADARx, USP MedMARx)
databases
medical records from multiple facilities
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leadership, these systems can provide valuable data for
patient safety improvement eﬀorts. This is particularly
true if the systems are non-punitive, have a focus that
extends beyond adverse events (e.g., near misses), and
utilize electronic processes for data collection and
analysis. If they are well integrated into routine insti-
tutional care processes, such systems will provide con-
stant surveillance and triggering, for example, daily
procedure-induced reporting of adverse events. These
advantages can help to overcome underreporting in-
herent in voluntary reporting systems.
Because medical chart reviews are so costly, alterna-
tives have been sought. The clinical surveillance diary
(SD) is part of the progress notes of the electronic
medical record and includes a list of adverse events with
medical actions taken, drugs administered, time-trend
parameters, and hospital course [18]. This yields a
physician-driven description of causative factors, and is
easy to update. However, there has apparently been
resistance by medical staﬀ to reveal adverse events using
this approach.
Organizational patient safety data gathering systems
can also be developed and supported by professional
societies and voluntary regulatory entities. A good ex-
ample of a professional society or association-based
system is the Medical Event Reporting System for
Transfusion Medicine (MERS-TM) [19]. MERS-TM
includes multiple components that facilitate event de-
tection (any person who discovers an event can complete
a discovery form), description and classiﬁcation, inves-
tigation, analysis, interpretation, and evaluation.
Many large clinical databases, supported by institu-
tions, national organizations, private parties, and gov-
ernment entities, can be used to extract information
about patient safety. These range from federal data-
bases, for example, containing cause of death informa-
tion of all deceased Medicare beneﬁciaries [20] to
smaller richer databases, for example, ‘‘closed claims’’
databases that contain detailed information about
malpractice cases that have been settled or adjudicated
[21,22]. The ASA Closed Claims database has thousands
of case ﬁles that contain copies of medical records, de-
position summaries, expert reviews, and outcome re-
ports. These collected data are checked for completeness
and consistency and then undergo further expert anal-
ysis. Limitations of closed claims data are that the se-
lection of cases is not random, the initial data collection
is done by insurance companies for liability purposes
rather than patient safety, it takes an average of 5 years
after an event occurs before the case enters the database,
and reviewers assessments of causality are aﬀected by
knowledge of case outcome [21,22].
The Veterans Administrations RADARx [23], the
Center for Disease Controls (CDC) VAERS, and Uni-
ted States Pharmacopeias (USP) MedMARx are ex-amples of large nationwide voluntary event reporting
systems. Practitioners can enter event data on hardcopy
forms, with computerized software, or via the internet.
MedMARx is an anonymous conﬁdential internet-based
adverse drug event reporting system. Subscribing hos-
pitals can access all of their own data and also obtain
standardized reports that show their results compared to
nationwide benchmarks. Similar systems are available
for cardiopulmonary resuscitation, cardiac surgical
outcomes, and other quality and safety outcome metrics.
2.2. Direct observation and interviews
Medical errors and events can be detected during
direct observation of clinical care. Much can be learned
about safety from traditional observational studies that
use ethnographic and related qualitative techniques
[24,25]. More quantitative human factors approaches
also generate useful data but trade-oﬀ reduced analysis
eﬀort for the less-ﬁltered richness of qualitative data.
Task analysis methods involve the structured decom-
position of work activities and/or decisions and the
classiﬁcation of these activities as a series of tasks,
processes, or classes. Behavioral task analysis can deﬁne
what tasks clinicians actually do under real-life condi-
tions [26]. Gilbreth [27] was the ﬁrst to apply work
measurement principles, developed by Taylor, to medi-
cine. Gilbreths time-and-motion study showed that
surgeons spent excessive time looking for the correct
instruments as they selected them from a tray. These
ﬁndings led to the current practice of the surgeon re-
questing instruments from a nurse, who places the in-
strument in the surgeons hand. More recently, similar
techniques have been used to study clinical workﬂow,
for example, in ICUs [28,29], emergency departments
[30], pharmacies [31], and of anesthesiologists [32], ra-
diologists [33], and nurses [28].
Data about clinical events can be obtained using a
variety of formal interview techniques. In addition to
details about the nature and course of events, these
techniques may elicit information about the mental state
and decision-making processes of the clinicians in-
volved. While direct observation will provide insights
into what clinicians do during actual (or simulated) pa-
tient care, in the absence of special human factors
techniques (e.g., think aloud protocols, situation
awareness probes, workload assessment), it will provide
only limited understanding of why they are doing what
they do. Thus, cognitive task analysis (CTA) techniques
can be used to elucidate the essential cognitive processes
that drive overt behavior [34]. CTA encompasses both
methods to ascertain the knowledge and cognitive skills
required to perform a complex task, and methods for
structuring and presenting this information in a usable
format [34,35]. The Critical Decision Method (CDM)
[36] is a CTA technique that may be particularly well
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ments, particularly those that involve stress, risk, and
uncertainty (e.g., critical care unit, operating room,
emergency department) [37].
2.3. Non-routine events
Although individual clinicians have often been
blamed for lapses in patient safety, research has shown
that the root causes of most adverse events are systemic
factors such as dysfunctional organizational structure,
inadequate training, faulty communication, or poorly
designed medical device user interfaces [1,5,38]. Such
system factors (also referred to as ‘‘latent errors’’) rep-
resent failure conditions that may lie dormant in com-
plex systems until activated by the rare coincidence of
multiple triggering events [10]. In complex, tightly cou-
pled systems that contain multiple, dynamic, interde-
pendent processes (e.g., surgical care), minor events in
certain combinations are most likely to activate these
latent errors, causing an accident [39]. Scrutiny of even
minor, unexpected events, may unveil underlying latent
errors that could otherwise remain hidden until an ac-
cident occurred.
Many popular methods for studying patient safety,
especially root cause and sentinel event analysis, may
have only limited value at preventing future adverse
events. Techniques that rely on identifying the causes of
speciﬁc events that have already produced patient injury
may be problematic for several reasons. First, prevent-
able serious adverse events are relatively uncommon.
Second, each adverse event is unique, invariably caused
by multiple factors presenting in a complex highly in-
terdependent way. It is extremely diﬃcult and time-
consuming to ascertain retrospectively the true root
causes of a single adverse event. Having invested pre-
cious patient safety or QI resources to elucidate the
putative ‘‘causes’’ of an event, it can be quite diﬃcult to
determine each causes relative contribution to event
occurrence, much less whether strategies to mitigate any
speciﬁc cause will prevent future events. In fact, targeted
interventions based on retrospective analysis of a single
event can inadvertently create new latent errors that
ultimately precipitate unanticipated adverse outcomes.
Thus, there is a need to investigate alternative data
collection strategies that can yield generalizable data
about care processes to identify potential causes of fu-
ture preventable adverse events.
One such alternative approach may be to study what
we call ‘‘non-routine events’’ (NRE). A NRE is deﬁned
as any event that is perceived by clinicians or skilled
observers to deviate from ideal care for that speciﬁc
patient in that speciﬁc clinical situation. Thus, NRE
include but are not the same as ‘‘near misses.’’ Whereas
near misses are events that seem to be, at the time, di-
rectly linked to possible patient injury, NRE do notnecessarily have a clearly identiﬁable injury path. How-
ever, all NRE can yield important information about
unknown or underappreciated system ﬂaws that, under
other (future) circumstances, could produce unsafe
conditions. The concept of the non-routine event (NRE)
in medicine was inspired by eﬀorts in other high-risk
ﬁelds to achieve safety by identifying and analyzing in
depth all deviations beyond expected or routine system
function. Preliminary data suggested that anesthesia
NRE occur in about 25% of all surgical cases in an ac-
ademic medical center [37]. Similarly, Boelle et al. [40]
reported a 24% incidence of ‘‘undesirable anesthetic
events’’ in a more circumscribed quality improvement
project. We hypothesized that a broader scope of patient
safety data collection could yield more events thereby
permitting a broad range of analytical methods to un-
cover evidence of dysfunctional clinical system attri-
butes or potentially dangerous conditions missed by
traditional data collection methods.
2.4. Preliminary evaluation of the non-routine event
concept in anesthesiology
In a pilot project to evaluate the potential value of
studying NRE, trained research assistants collected data
on randomly selected days in the Post-Anesthesia Care
Units (PACU) at the University of California San Diego
Medical Center and the Veterans Aﬀairs San Diego
Medical Center. With Human Subjects Committee ap-
proval, a researcher brieﬂy interviewed anesthesia pro-
viders after they had transferred their patients care to
the PACU nurse or, if there was insuﬃcient time, during
the quiescent maintenance phase of the next case. A
standardized data collection form (Appendix A) was
used to ascertain whether a NRE occurred in the just-
completed case and to obtain initial information about
the events nature and possible etiology. This NRE
identiﬁcation technique rarely took more than 5min to
complete.
We also collected data about anesthesia care events
from our two hospitals traditional peer-review or
quality improvement systems. We obtained retrospec-
tive case data from one hospitals departmental QI
process where, after every anesthetic, the provider is
supposed to ﬁll out a hardcopy form that indicates if one
or more speciﬁc clinical events occurred during the case.
The data from these forms, along with the relevant
medical records and dictated event summaries were
abstracted. We also collected data about cases presented
at the other hospitals mandatory departmental mor-
bidity and mortality (M&M) conferences.
Each case identiﬁed was assigned a randomly gener-
ated unique code number to assure anonymity and the
data were then entered into a custom password-pro-
tected database, written in FileMaker Pro and residing
on a central server. To ensure conﬁdentiality, all names
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patients, as well as speciﬁc dates, were stripped from all
data records. At least two clinicians then independently
reviewed the case information in the database and the
medical records for that case (e.g., anesthesia record,
preoperative summary sheet, QI reports, etc.). The da-
tabase also contained available information about the
patient [e.g., age, gender, and American Society of An-
esthesiologists (ASA) physical status score], the anes-
thesia provider (e.g., age, years of experience), the
anesthetic technique (e.g., primary type of anesthesia),
and surgical care (e.g., type of surgery performed). In
many cases, because of the retrospective nature of the
event reports, desired data elements were missing. Cli-
nician reviewers scored whether the event caused patient
impact (had an eﬀect on the patient physiologically or
psychologically), was a ‘‘near miss’’ [12], or actually
caused patient injury, and, if the latter, the severity of
injury (using a standard scale developed for the ASA
Closed Claims Study [22]). Speciﬁc causes of patient
impact or injury were coded with a standardized struc-
tured taxonomy in which each possible outcome has a
unique code number.1 Reviewers also scored whether
any of 19 ‘‘contributory factors’’ appeared to play a role
in the occurrence of the event. The clinicians then dis-
cussed and reviewed the cases together and reached a
consensus on each item scored. Unresolved diﬀerences
of opinion were resolved by a third domain expert.3. Analytical methods
3.1. General analytical approach to patient safety data
The ﬁrst step in extracting information from data
obtained by various data collection methods is to un-
derstand the diﬀerent sources of bias and variability
inherent in these techniques (this is discussed in more
detail below). Two main types of data are collected in
these systems: ﬁxed patient, provider, and system attri-
butes (for instance, demographical patient data) and
contributory (perhaps preventable) risk factors. The
next step in understanding safety data is to inspect the
data qualitatively or descriptively. This stage could in-
volve summary statistics (such as means, medians, and
standard deviations), descriptive graphs (histograms,
scatter plots), and a thorough analysis of unusual or
inﬂuential observations. Since the incidence of patient
injury is hopefully quite low, these catastrophic or un-
usual cases, often considered statistical outliers, should1 This adverse event taxonomy was developed in collaboration with
anesthesiologists at the Chang-Gung Memorial Hospital, Taoyuan,
Taiwan, Republic of China. A copy is available upon request from the
authors.be examined in great depth to understand the mecha-
nism or sequence of events leading to patient injury.
The general analytical approach to patient safety data
will depend upon the goals of the project and the hy-
potheses under investigation. In a hypothesis-driven
retrospective patient safety study, an appropriate
case-control framework can be designed to study the
relationship between an adverse patient outcome and
exposure to possible contributory factors. For hypoth-
esis-driven, case-control studies, it is necessary to have
contributory factors data collected on both patients that
have experienced an adverse outcome (cases) and pa-
tients who have not (controls). Data collected from
Quality Improvement (QI) or other peer review pro-
cesses (including M&M conference proceedings) are not
suitable for these types of studies, given that these cases
are pre-selected - they reﬂect adverse patient events,
serious near misses, or otherwise have unusual or special
clinical circumstances. However, since QI data speciﬁ-
cally address the causative factors leading to patient
injury, they can be used to develop various hypotheses
regarding the mechanisms or paths of injury.
Events leading to patient injury are considered to be
multi-factorial in nature [10], which makes it diﬃcult to
specify a priori the factors that should be studied. An-
other approach that can be taken with patient safety
data is an exploratory analysis, in which the multivariate
relationship between contributory factors is determined
via data mining techniques such as cluster analyses,
classiﬁcation and regression trees, and mixture models.
3.2. Engineering analysis methods
A variety of engineering techniques can facilitate ef-
forts to improve the safety and eﬃciency of clinical care.
Methods from industrial engineering such as risk anal-
ysis and quality control have been employed produc-
tively for safety in a wide range of domains [8,41]. For
example, Xerox reduced the percentage of defective
parts by a factor of 30 through use of quality control.
Human factors engineering techniques, including heu-
ristic analysis, expert reviews, behavioral and cognitive
task analysis, clinical simulation, think aloud protocols,
situation awareness probing, and workload assessment,
have been used in the design, evaluation, and modiﬁ-
cation of medical devices and clinical processes [4,42,43].
Cognitive work analyses, in which system functions are
decomposed, abstracted, and prioritized, can help to
understand events and processes, identify system re-
quirements, ascertain proper allocation of people and
equipment, or facilitate the design of information or
decision support systems [4,44,45].
Quality control techniques can be applied to aggre-
gated data or to individual events. The application
to aggregate data is well described in the clinical qual-
ity control (often termed quality or performance
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extended to patient safety speciﬁc issues [46,47]. For
individual clinical events, safety engineering and risk
management methods like fault tree analysis (FTA) and
failure modes, eﬀects and criticality analysis (FMECA)
identify the consequence of failures and the probability
of such failures. By combining the severity of a failure
with the probability of the underlying causes, it is pos-
sible to identify critical aspects of the system, and where
safety interventions may have the greatest beneﬁt. FTA
is a top-down approach that uses domain and system
analysis expertise to ascertain possible scenarios that can
have system level consequences. For each negative sys-
tem level outcome, the experts attempt to identify all
possible scenarios that can lead to these negative out-
comes. Alternatively, FMECA is a bottom-up approach
that begins by analyzing the consequence of failures at
the individual component level, and can potentially
identify failure modes overlooked in a top-down ap-
proach. The two approaches are complementary and
their use minimizes possible oversights in either ap-
proach. The validity of a safety engineering analysis
depends on the generation of a model that accurately
describes the relationship between individual failures
and overall consequence at the system level, and on the
availability of accurate data regarding the probability of
individual failure events.
3.3. Speciﬁc methods to analyze our retrospective anes-
thesia safety data
In our studies, the key variable of interest is the oc-
currence of a NRE. In the PACU surveys, cases (oc-
currence of NRE) could be distinguished from controls
(no NRE). The case-selection bias with the PACU sur-
vey technique is minimal although data collection oc-
curred only during regular daytime shifts so nighttime
cases were excluded. In contrast, the other source of
retrospective data (QI and M&M reports) presents a
strong selection bias, since they primarily represent cases
in which an adverse patient outcome either did or could
have occurred (i.e., by deﬁnition, a NRE). After iden-
tifying the cohort, exposure to various potential con-
tributory factors was examined. As a quality control
measure, the data were initially examined with univari-
ate techniques to identify unusual or inﬂuential obser-
vations, and case data from outliers were reexamined.
Additionally, data from the two sources were analyzed
separately to provide a rough indication of reporting
bias.
A list of potential contributory factors was generated
based on experience, a review of the patient safety lit-
erature, and analysis of pilot data. A diﬀerent list may
be generated for other clinical domains. The role of
these putative contributory factors were then assessed
by two domain experts in each NRE case in the data-base. To facilitate statistical model building, individual
dichotomous contributory factors were combined into
ten dichotomous composite variables as described in the
legend of Table 4. Note that if any individual contrib-
utory factor in a group was coded as being present,
then the entire composite category was coded as being
present.
3.4. Statistical methods
A variety of statistical methods can be applied to
patient safety data depending on its structure and the
goals of the analysis. In our study, the response variable
of interest was the occurrence or non-occurrence of a
NRE, a dichotomous variable. Thus, a two-stage anal-
ysis was performed. The ﬁrst stage was ‘‘variable-di-
rected’’ [48], in which a relationship between the
dependent variable, NRE occurrence, and independent
(or predictor) variables was established. The second
stage was ‘‘individual-directed’’ [48], in which relation-
ships between individual cases and independent vari-
ables were investigated. For the ﬁrst stage, univariate
tests were conducted to determine associations between
patient and provider attributes and NRE occurrence.
Here, we considered ﬁve predictor variables: three pa-
tient attributes (age, gender, ASA status), level of an-
esthesia provider experience, and type of anesthetic
administered. At this stage, the 10 composite contribu-
tory factors were not included in the modeling, since
data on these factors cannot be collected for non-NRE
cases. Also, only data obtained from the PACU surveys
were considered, since the QI data did not contain
routine cases. Categorical variables were tested via the
v2 procedure. The only continuous variable, age, was
discretized and then the v2 procedure was used.
These univariate tests were used to build a larger
multivariate logistic regression model, which was then
used to investigate our ﬁrst research question; ‘‘which
risk factors are associated with, or predict, the occur-
rence of an NRE?’’ Here, a p value less than 0.3 from the
univariate tests was used as the inclusion criterion to
enter the logistic model. Factors in the multivariate lo-
gistic model with a p value less than 0.05 were consid-
ered statistically signiﬁcant. Logistic regression is a type
of regression used when the dependent variable is di-
chotomous, while the independent variables can take
either a categorical or continuous form [49]. In logistic
regression, the dependent variable undergoes a logit
transformation, such that the regression is based on
the natural log of the odds of the dependent variable
occurring.
In the second stage of the analysis, groups of similar
individual cases were identiﬁed to address our second
research question; ‘‘Are there speciﬁc combinations of
risk factors that produce certain types of NRE?’’ Data
from the PACU surveys and QI reports were considered
Table 3
Categorization of putative contributory factors in retrospective anes-
thesia non-routine eventsa
Patient disease/unexpected response 156 67.0%
Provider supervision, knowledge, experience,
or judgment
76 32.6%
Surgical issues 61 26.2%
Logistical or system issues 44 18.9%
Preoperative preparation 40 17.2%
Equipment failure or usability 36 15.5%
Coordination/communication 34 14.6%
Patient positioning 21 9.0%
Other 14 6.0%
Environmental factors/support staﬀ 5 2.2%
aTotal cases¼ 233. Note that each NRE generally has more than
one contributory factor.
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pothesis that the probability of each factor contributing
to a NRE is not the same across all ten factors [50].
Finally, an exploratory hierarchical clustering ap-
proach [51] for dichotomous variables was applied to
isolate combinations of the ten contributory factors that
contribute to speciﬁc NRE. The objective of clustering is
to partition a set of data into groups such that the ob-
servations in a single group are similar to one another,
while observations in diﬀerent groups are as diﬀerent as
possible. A ‘‘similarity’’ measure is the key to determin-
ing how the clusters are formed. Similarity or dissimi-
larity between observations is expressed in terms of a
distance measure dðx; yÞ, where x and y are individual
observations. The type of distance measure selected will
depend on the type of data (i.e., categorical, ordinal,
ratio, or continuous) under consideration. In our study,
the observations were the individual NRE cases, and the
clustering was based on the 10 composite contributory
factors. The 10 composite factors were considered to be
asymmetric binary variables, since the two states (i.e., did
or did not contribute to the NRE) for each variable were
not equally important. An appropriate distance measure
for non-invariant similarity utilized as the clustering
criteria was the Jaccard distance measure [51]. Hierar-
chical clustering via the centroid method was performed,
in which similarity of the clusters was determined by
comparing the average values for the clusters. A dis-
similarity value was calculated for each of these centroid
computations, and the two clusters with the lowest dis-
similarity score (i.e., the two most similar clusters) were
merged in that iteration of the clustering algorithm. Data
from cases allocated to the resulting clusters were then
examined to address the third research question; ‘‘Does
the type of NRE (as deﬁned by the pattern of contribu-
tory factors) predict the severity of NRE outcome?’’
3.5. Preliminary results for retrospective anesthesiology
NRE
Thus far, data have been collected from 72 diﬀerent
anesthesia residents, certiﬁed registered nurse anesthe-
tists (CRNA), and board-certiﬁed anesthesiologists.
Although the interview process presented some logistical
challenges (e.g., busy clinical schedules, the need for
divided or follow-up interviews, etc.), the subjects were
quite cooperative and only rarely turned down a request
for event information. 277 cases were collected in the
early post-operative period (usually in the PACU im-
mediately after the case of interest) using the retro-
spective survey instrument. Seventy-ﬁve cases had at
least one NRE—an incidence of 27%. Some cases had
more than one NRE with an overall total of 98 NRE
(net incidence 35%). Forty-six of the PACU-collected
cases (17%) had patient impact while 20 (7%) led to
patient injury.Concurrently, we collected clinical events identiﬁed
through our hospitals traditional QI reporting systems.
The incidence of events detected through this process is
relatively low—in 2002, one hospitals comprehensive QI
process captured 86 notable events out of 3200 cases
(2.7%) while the other hospitals departmental M&M
conference proceedings reported on 82 notable events
out of 11,500 anesthetic cases (0.7%). All of these events
were considered NRE.
Of 135 QI events analyzed to date from both hospi-
tals, 120 (89%) had patient impact and 74 (55%) led to
patient injury. Thus, the NRE collected randomly with
our survey instrument were less likely to have a patient
impact (p < 0:001) and much less likely to lead to pa-
tient injury (p < 0:001) than the events reported through
these traditional QI reporting systems. Note that none
of the NRE cases in the PACU data were duplicated in
either of the two QI data sets.
For all 233 NRE cases collected retrospectively (i.e.,
both PACU and QI), there was a patient impact in 166
NRE (71%) with 94 of these events (40%) producing
patient injury. One hundred and eleven of the NRE
(48%) could be classiﬁed as ‘‘near misses.’’
A preliminary analysis of all of these retrospective
NRE cases suggested several putative contributory fac-
tors (Table 3). The patients preexisting disease and/or an
unexpected physiological response played a role in over
two-thirds of all retrospective NRE. In slightly over a
third of NRE, issues related to provider supervision,
knowledge, experience, or judgment (SKEJ) may have
contributed to the event. In fact, 66 out of 167 NRE in-
volving anesthesia residents were coded as having at least
one putative SKEJ factor (39%) whereas only 10 of 53
cases (19%) involving experienced CRNA did (p < 0:01).
Contributory factors included surgical requirements
(e.g., need for lights out to view monitors during lapa-
roscopy led to delayed detection of patient malposi-
tioning), surgeon action or inaction (e.g., a respiratory
gas sampling line was inadvertently clamped by the
surgeons precluding eﬀective respiratory monitoring),
114 M.B. Weinger et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 36 (2003) 106–119and logistical or system issues (e.g., ﬂuoroscopy was not
available when needed so that the case duration was
longer than expected). Inadequate preoperative patient
preparation contributed to quite a few NRE—for ex-
ample, failure to appreciate the magnitude of patients
pre-existing disease, to order necessary laboratory ex-
ams in a timely manner, or to discuss key aspects of
intraoperative management with the surgeons before
inducing anesthesia (which was also coded as a com-
munication factor).
There was a signiﬁcant number of NRE involving
clinical equipment. Although, as in previous studies
[52,53], there was a relatively low incidence of outright
equipment failure, problems with equipment usability [5],
reliability, and availability) commonly played a role in
NRE. This issue merits a more detailed investigation.
We also noted a higher than expected incidence of
NRE related to patient positioning. Although posi-
tioning injuries are recognized as a serious cause of
surgical patient morbidity, hypotheses for etiology and
proposed prevention strategies have been previously
primarily based on retrospective database analysis
[54,55]. These NRE data appear to provide comple-
mentary information that can guide both local process
improvements and potential prospective studies.
3.6. Results of statistical modeling
There were insuﬃcient data in this preliminary anal-
ysis to include all of the patient-related factors in the
statistical models. Data for two factors, provider expe-
rience and type of primary anesthetic, could be included.
Experience was a four-level categorical variable that
includes inexperienced (CA1, CA2) and intermediate
(CA3) residents, experienced (i.e., board-certiﬁed or el-
igible) physician providers, and Certiﬁed Registered
Nurse Anesthetists (CRNA) with at least 5 years of
clinical experience. The ﬁve types of anesthetics were
general, spinal, epidural, regional block, and local. v2
tests of association, performed between each factor and
the occurrence of a NRE, did not attain statistical sig-
niﬁcance (anesthesia type: p value¼ 0.29; clinician ex-
perience: p value¼ 0.125).
A multivariate analysis was performed to evaluate the
role of each of the ten composite contributory factors in
NRE occurrence. A 10-dimensional contingency table
was constructed separately for the PACU and QI ret-
rospective data and a Cochrans Q test was performed.
Preliminary ﬁndings for both types of data were statis-
tically signiﬁcant (PACU: p value¼ 0.0001, n ¼ 98; QI:
p value¼ 0.0001, n ¼ 135), suggesting that the proba-
bility of each factor contributing to a NRE is not the
same across all 10 variables. This is consistent with the
expectation that patient safety events are multifactorial
in origin and putative contributory factors will be dif-
ferent across a cohort of non-selected cases.A cluster analysis was then conducted to discern
diﬀerences between the contributory factors and high-
light dependencies, if any, amongst these factors. The
PACU and QI data produced diﬀerent clustering con-
ﬁgurations. The PACU data were partitioned into six
clusters, in which each cluster consisted of primarily one
dominating factor (Table 4A). Provider and patient
factors were the most prevalent in this preliminary
analysis. There were no clear dependencies between the
contributory factors, except that approximately half of
the cases in both the surgical- and system-related clus-
ters also had teamwork problems. This is consistent with
other data suggesting the importance of provider–pro-
vider communication in team-based patient care [38]. As
seen in the table, there were no obvious relationships
between cluster and patient outcome (percent of cases
with patient impact or injury severity). However, with
the collection of additional cases, we believe this ap-
proach could yield valuable insights into the choice of
patient safety interventions likely to have the greatest
impact on patient outcomes. Unlike the PACU data, the
QI cases produced only one major cluster and several
smaller clusters (Table 4B). This is perhaps not sur-
prising since patients with a history of pre-existing dis-
ease or those who have an unexpected physiological
responses are more likely to have an unusual or adverse
event leading to their capture through traditional de-
partmental peer-review processes.
Because NRE vary in terms of severity (e.g., from
delayed case starts to patient death), the range of NRE
can be considered a continuum in which it is then dif-
ﬁcult to specify a priori the number of possibly over-
lapping clusters. Thus, traditional hierarchical clustering
techniques may not yield an optimal solution under
these circumstances.4. Discussion
4.1. Limitations of retrospective methods of data collec-
tion
There are inherent biases that aﬀect both the report-
ing and investigation of adverse events, which also sig-
niﬁcantly limits their value for improving patient safety.
For a number of reasons, only a small proportion of
adverse events are ever reported [12], resulting in a po-
tentially biased sample from which to draw conclusions.
In addition, retrospective analysis of adverse events or
near misses is often contaminated by cognitive biases
(especially hindsight and attribution bias) [11,56] and
inﬂuenced by the context and the perspective of event
participants and analysts [57]. Importantly, the results
of adverse event analysis are strongly inﬂuenced by
knowledge of their outcome [21,58]. Because of these
limitations, the most important causes of future adverse
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safety.
Data integrity and quality issues often arise in the
collection of retrospective event data. For example, in
our study, the PACU survey data obtained from anes-
thesia providers might not have been accurate or there
may have been a ‘‘recall bias’’ in the reporting of events
that occurred. A serious consequence of recall bias is
that a NRE could be overlooked, and this would inad-
vertently lead to classifying a potential NRE case as a
control case instead. Another problem with (especially
anonymous) survey data is that once a sample is col-
lected it is frequently impossible to go back and obtain
missing or additional sources of data. For example,
patient demographical details were not collected in early
PACU surveys; this problem has since been rectiﬁed.
4.2. Potential advantages of studying non-routine events
Non-routine events oﬀer a number of advantages for
patient safety research. First, these events encompass a
substantially larger class of events than adverse events,
medical errors, or even ‘‘near misses.’’ Because of their
frequency, NRE represent a potentially rich data source
to be ‘‘mined’’ to generate hypotheses about key factors
and processes related to safety. This facilitates data
collection permitting for example, the cost-eﬀective
conduct of in-person surveys (which enhances voluntary
reporting) and prospective studies. Second, although
labeling a given event as ‘‘non-routine’’ will not be free
from bias, there may be less opportunity for biases to
aﬀect reporting or investigation, as most NRE will not
be associated with any obvious error or patient injury.
Third, NRE can be identiﬁed prospectively, as care is
being delivered, either by provider report or observa-
tion, reducing the impact of bias due to knowledge of
outcome. Finally, analysis of NRE may also be partic-
ularly helpful in delineating processes that could result
in ineﬃcient or unsafe care. Our pilot data identiﬁed
many process ineﬃciencies as NRE triggers, including
lost or missing paperwork or medical records, delayed
surgeons, unavailability of equipment or personnel, and
failure to perform standard preoperative procedures or
obtain data. For example, in one case, the NRE was the
cancellation of surgery after the patient was already
anesthetized because surgical house staﬀ failed to con-
ﬁrm that the attending surgeon was available, a process
failure with both safety and eﬃciency implications.
4.3. Limitations of non-routine event analysis
The collection and analysis of NRE will not provide
experimental evidence that any particular clinical pro-
cess caused patient injury or that a proposed interven-
tion will reduce medical errors or improve safety.
Rather, in-depth analysis of actual care processes and
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hypotheses about factors inﬂuencing system safety—
policies, processes, and actions that aﬀect the occur-
rence, propagation, or prevention of patient injury [32].
In many clinical circumstances, this may be suﬃcient to
guide reengineering and other process improvement ef-
forts that will have a tangible eﬀect on patient safety.
However, proof that any given factor plays either a
positive or negative role in safety will necessitate ex-
perimental methods including controlled simulation
and/or clinical trials.
It should be noted that in our study the events were
analyzed and coded from the perspective of anesthesia
care providers. Therefore, some events, for example,
those in which surgical and/or positioning issues were
coded as being contributory factors, may be seen dif-
ferently from the perspective of surgeons or other op-
erating room personnel.
To make the study of NRE a viable endeavor, several
challenges must be met. Distinguishing non-routine
from routine events is complicated by the fact that what
is routine to one clinician may be exceptional to another.
Even serious safety ﬂaws might be considered ‘‘routine’’
by providers inured to their presence. Routine and non-
routine must be carefully deﬁned, either based on local
practice and expectations, or using a suﬃciently broad
context to assure capture of a wide range of events and
processes that could jeopardize patient safety. At the
local level, multidisciplinary teams of practicing clini-
cians, quality improvement personnel, risk managers,
and high-level administrators should participate in both
study design and data analysis. Provider education
about the non-routine event concept will be a critical
element in the techniques success. Additionally, even
with these precautions, reliance on clinician event re-
porting may be less than fully successful for the reasons
delineated earlier, unless all personnel involved in pa-
tient care (i.e., not just physicians, pharmacists, and
nurses but medical technicians, orderlies, clerks, and
janitors) have the opportunity to participate. Finally,
prospective data collection by trained observers may be
an important independent mechanism for event identi-
ﬁcation and veriﬁcation of reporting incidence and ac-
curacy. In the absence of prospective data collection,
analysis of reported NRE could be inﬂuenced by some
of the same biases aﬀecting retrospective error or acci-
dent reporting systems. However, since most NRE do
not involve patient injury and are often caused by fac-
tors unrelated to the competence or actions of the re-
porter, the risk of a biased account of these events
appears less likely.
4.4. What about prospective data collection?
Prospective empirical studies of patient safety avoid
many of the methodological pitfalls of retrospectiveanalyses but have their own limitations including cost
and time constraints, the need for large numbers of
subjects, and diﬃculty controlling, measuring, or ac-
counting for the complex interdependent clinical and
environmental factors likely to play a prominent role in
patient safety [43]. Patient safety oriented prospective
randomized controlled trials conducted in actual patient
care settings have generally either examined a putative
contributory factor (e.g., sleep deprivation/fatigue dur-
ing on-call shifts [59]) or measured the impact of a po-
tential intervention (e.g., reduced incidence of serious
medication errors with the implementation of comput-
erized physician order entry [60]). Preliminary results
suggest that NRE can be collected prospectively through
the videotaping of actual patient care. However, these
resource-intensive studies of real-life clinician–patient
encounters are dependent on knowing the cause of
events, and are complicated by the base rate of medical
events in the patient population of interest (which may
be quite low, particularly for those producing serious
adverse events) as well as the tremendous heterogeneity
of patient and confounding factors. Human factors
techniques can be applied prospectively, and may not
suﬀer these same limitations. For example, events as-
sociated with the use of a medical device can be proac-
tively reduced by the iterative evaluation in a laboratory
of prototypes of the devices user interface to discern
potential sources of use error [4,5].
Simulation studies are a viable, but also resource-in-
tensive, alternative to the study of actual patient care. A
well-controlled reproducible simulated interaction be-
tween clinical care provider(s) and a patient (or another
clinician) can be conducted using realistic patient or
virtual reality simulators, or standardized patients. Re-
alistic patient simulators are fully interactive physical
simulations in which the patient mannequin responds to
clinical interventions just as would a real patient [61,62].
Virtual reality simulators are computer-based multi-
media devices that ‘‘immerse’’ the clinician in a clinically
realistic computer-generated environment [63]. Stan-
dardized patients are professional actors trained to ac-
curately and consistently provide a live, interactive
simulation of an actual physician–patient encounter and
who can be inserted into actual clinical practices to
evaluate the quality or cost of care [64]. Such ‘‘stan-
dardized encounters’’ allow for the real-time study of
many facets of medical care processes, and thus repre-
sent an important supplementary approach to under-
standing risks to patient safety or the potential eﬃcacy
of proposed safety interventions.
4.5. Extension of the NRE technique
It should be relatively straightforward to study NRE
in acute care settings, including the operating room,
labor and delivery suites, intensive care units, emergency
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situations. Even if the technique was limited to these
high-acuity domains, it would still be of signiﬁcant value
since a substantial proportion of all preventable adverse
patient outcomes occur in these acute care domains [65].
How applicable the NRE approach will be to other, less
acute (e.g., ambulatory) care settings remains to be
determined.
Since the NRE technique represents a systematic
approach to the study of complex processes, it could
shed light on undesirable deviations or potential failures
in various systems, components, or interactions that
may have distributed, and sometimes unanticipated,
eﬀects on patient care. Finally, shifting the focus of
patient safety initiatives to the collection and analysis of
non-routine events (instead of only medical errors or
adverse outcomes) within an institution may facilitate
the desired inculcation of a safety culture.
This paper has provided a framework for, and out-
lined some of, the types of retrospective data collection
and analysis methods that can be productively applied
to patient safety research. In particular, the concept of
the non-routine event has been introduced. Preliminary
data suggest that NRE data can be successfully collected
and analyzed, and that the resulting information can
generate testable hypotheses about threats to, and op-
portunities for improving, the safety of clinical pro-
cesses. Further research appears warranted to determine
if identiﬁcation of factors that contribute to the occur-
rence of, and recovery from, non-routine events will
advance patient safety.Acknowledgments
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Told to subject:
‘‘We are beginning to study how unusual or non-
routine occurrences might directly or indirectly aﬀect
anesthesia providers ability to detect, interpret, or treat2 Designed for use in anesthesiology.adverse events during anesthesia. Most of what we call
‘‘non-routine events’’ may seem trivial, but under-
standing what causes them and how they aﬀect you will
lead to a better appreciation of the essential attributes of
safer anesthesia care. We would like to ask you some
brief questions about the case youve just completed.’’
1. Were there any deviations from ideal?
2. In what ways was the anesthetic less than optimal?
3. Did anything occur that was annoying?
4. Did anything occur that was distracting?
5. Did you make any unanticipated or unplanned ac-
tions or interventions?
6. Were any unusual requests or demands made on you?
7. Did anything occur that aﬀected your workload?
8. Did anything occur that aﬀected your vigilance?
Speciﬁc probes:
1. Did your tools and equipment perform as expected?
2. Was there anything distinctive about other peoples
actions or interactions with you?
3. Did the patient do anything that was out-of-the-or-
dinary or notable?
4. Did the patient respond as expected to your treat-
ment and interventions?
If YES to any of the above:
1. Please brieﬂy describe the event.
2. What about the event made it stand-out?
3. What were your initial clues that something was
atypical?
4. Why did it occur?
5. What were the precipitating factors?
6. How did you respond (if you did)?
7. What factors, issues, or other events inﬂuenced your
response?
8. What was the result of your intervention?
9. Was there any temporary or permanent patient in-
jury as a result of event?
10. What is your estimate of the percent likelihood that
the event, if not managed correctly, could have led to
patient injury?References
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